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In contemporary discussions of global governance, many scholars have posited the possibility that networks of new social movements, publicly oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nonstate actors have the potential to create pressures for increased transparency and accountability. A more legitimate democratic global politics would follow such developments. Such networks are often seen to be the base of "global civil society." Understanding the origins of global civil society is important if we are to adequately assess its possible contribution to addressing the challenge of global democratic governance in an era of globalization.
In this article, we evaluate two different views about the origins of global civil society. The first suggests that global civil society has been developing rationally over a long period of time, continuous with the development of domestic civil society in democracies. The second postulates that global civil society is a relatively new phenomenon that has emerged to respond to unprecedented challenges to democracy as a result of globalization. We offer some initial research and reflections on these hypotheses.
Using a case study of political activity in the area of plant biotechnology, we find evidence that the second hypothesis?focused on the novelty and recent origins of global civil society?is more credible. Not only is the for
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Global Civil Society and Nontern torial Governance mation of a transnational policy space in this area quite recent, but also the dominant organizational form in the space tends toward networks, which in turn are becoming more globally extensive. The politics of global civil society are highly contentious and by no means confined to the rational vol untary action emphasized by the first hypothesis. We organize our presentation of the evidence for this argument in the following steps. First, we outline the arguments about the origins of global civil society. Second, we offer a working definition of nonterritorial gover nance and assess its implications for democratic politics. Third, we briefly describe the emergent transnational policy space for plant biotechnology, outline the principal spheres of authority in the space, and note the intense, highly contested nature of politics involved. We then describe the organi zational characteristics of key civil society actors present in the space, not ing the dominance of the network form and the strong recent pressures for global extensity. In the last section, we return to the concept of global civil society, make some suggestions about ways it might be defined, and com ment on its relationship to democracy.
The Origins of Global Civil Society
Two somewhat competing perspectives have emerged on the origins of global civil society. These perspectives, in turn, can be linked to differing views of the novelty of contemporary globalization. A first view sees global civil society as an arena of political activity that has grown gradually and continuously since the mid-nineteenth century, with perhaps some acceler ation in the period after 1945. John Boli and George Thomas make this argument most persuasively, arguing that a world culture and a world polity have emerged over this period. In their words, the world has come to be "conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by net works of exchange, competition and cooperation, such that actors have found it 'natural' to view the whole world as their arena of action and dis course."1 They add that this world polity consists of a world culture, "a set of fundamental principles and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature and purposes of social actors and action."2 This culture is global, Boli and Thomas argue, in that it is cognitively con structed in similar ways and is applicable throughout the world. 3. Rational voluntaristic activity: Political action takes the form of "responsible individuals acting collectively through rational procedures" who can in turn "determine cultural rules that are just, equitable, and effi cient, and that no external authority is required for their legitimation."5 4. Rationalization:
In engaging in rationalized and rationalizing activ ity, political activity seeks to achieve "rational progress." 5. In addition, as governments have become confronted with global prob lems such as climate change, stability of financial markets, and the protection of human rights, they have moved to set up numerous intergovernmental organizations operating on a global scale. Drawing on his expertise on con tentious politics and social movement theory. Sydney Tarrow suggests that when states create international institutions to serve their collective interest, these, in turn, create incentives for transnational activism. 10 The need of officials in these institutions for legitimation and for sources of information generates still further incentives. These incentives "combine to create a transnational, activist elite that staffs international non-governmental organ izations and comes together within and against the policies of international institutions."11 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink observe that these elites, in turn, form alliances with states, selected officials within inter national institutions, and domestic social movements to form "transnational activist networks."12 They add, however, that these networks can also arise in response to states blocking policy initiatives at the nation-state level. 13 In this respect, John Keane notes, "It can be argued that global civil society is also the by-product of governmental or intergovernmental action or in action."14 Mary Kaldor amplifies this point by noting a synergy between states committed to multilateralism and global civil society: "The more multilateral the state, then the more it is likely to provide access to and funding for global civil society groups as a way of strengthening support for multilateralism. And the more a society is globalized and the more multi lateral the government, the more favourable is the infrastructure and the opportunity for the growth of global civil society. "15 This perspective on the origins of global civil society differs from the world culture approach in three ways. First, it puts greater emphasis on the information and communications technology revolution and its impact on social organization. Castells writes, "As a historical trend, dominant func tions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of the networking logic substantially modifies the opera tion and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and cul ture."16 Keck and Sikkink capture this aspect in their focus on transnational activist networks, but they are far from alone. Virtually all scholars who write about global civil society as a new phenomenon emphasize the impor tance of network logics.
Second, rather than seeing growing consensus on a world culture, they stress that increasing levels of interdependence leads to greater conscious ness of difference. Roland Robertson writes, "In an increasingly globalized world there is a heightening of civilizational, societal, ethnic, regional and, indeed, individual self-consciousness."17 John Tomlinson adds that global ization "is a far more complex process than can be grasped in the simple story of the unilinear advance of the West. . . . For all the superficial signs of cultural convergence that might be identified, the threat of a more profound homogenization of culture can only be deduced by ignoring the complexity, reflexivity and sheer recalcitrance of actual, particular cultural responses to modernity."18 For these reasons, global civil society is much more likely to be populated with various forms of contentious politics and even violence than with rational voluntarism. Moreover, differences in points of view on crucial points of debate can be particularly deep and difficult to reconcile.
Finally, those favoring the view that global civil society is a recent development stress that the period since the end of World War II, and par ticularly the last thirty years, has seen the emergence of a host of new spheres of authority that coexist with states. James Rosenau hypothesizes that "spheres of authority other than states designed to cope with the links and overlaps between localizing and globalizing dynamics will evolve and render the global stage ever more dense."19 On the one hand, this added complexity makes more urgent the need for coordination between states, and between states and alternative spheres of authority. On the other hand, the global politics that global civil society is part of can become beset with conflicts immensely more difficult to resolve than at the domestic level, if only because of the absence of any world state able to make decisions or to organize coordination and consensus building.
In summary, these two hypotheses about the origins of global civil society differ in several key aspects: the timing of its origin (less recent or recent); the dominant logic of organization (voluntary association or net work); the pressure on organizations to be globally extensive (moderate or intense); the nature of politics (rational or highly contentious); and the source of legitimacy (rational voluntarism or highly contested). In this respect, we suggest that nonterritorial governance takes place in transnational policy spaces, generated in response to pressures by states and civil society actors to address global problems.24 The choice of the word space signifies that borders and boundaries for policymaking are variable and porous and are being created and re-created in response to globalizing processes and policy developments. In transnational spaces, states "act" alongside a range of nonstate actors. In these spaces, however, the symme try and congruence between decisionmakers and citizens characteristic of "territorial governance" is lost. Some analysts suggest that global civil soci ety can help address this loss by creating direct linkages between global policymaking and citizens.
Democracy

The Transnational Policy Space for Plant Biotechnology
With this understanding of nonterritorial governance in mind, we turn to the politics of plant biotechnology. The genetic engineering associated with the development and commercial use of plant biotechnology involves moving the information coded in a given gene or gene sequence from one living organism to another. Unlike past efforts of this kind, recombinant DNA techniques permit this transfer of information to occur outside the bounds of place, whether defined as physical location or as species type. A gene can be removed from a living organism found in one physical location in the world and placed in another living organism that would never have ordinarily had any physical contact with the first. Moreover, the species type of the second organism may be completely different from that of the first. In this respect, the information encoded in genes is able to move across supraterritorial spaces. Genetic information can become globalized in ways not possible in the past.
Several developments related to the application of these technologies to plants, particularly plants cultivated in agriculture, have generated pres sures for nonterritorial governance and the creation of a transnational pol icy space. First, a small number of large transnational corporations based in the United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan have controlled research and development in this area and have led the commercialization of genetically modified (GM) plants. These firms, in turn, seek to market their products globally, wherever commercial agriculture promises them a good economic return. Close to 99 percent of GM crops commercially grown in the world involve four extensively traded commodities: soybeans, corn or maize, canola (a form of rapeseed), and cotton. The United States is the largest producer and exporter of these crops, followed by Argentina, Canada, and China.
Three of these commodities?soybeans, maize, and canola?are con sumed directly by human beings or indirectly in a wide range of processed foods and in meat from livestock raised on soybeans or maize. Given the novelty of the technology, the lack of confidence in nation-state regulation of food safety, and suspicions about global corporations more generally, many individuals, organizations, and social movements have opposed GM crops and foods, arguing that they are potentially unsafe for human or ani mal consumption. In the EU in particular, after Monsanto 's herbicide resist ant soybeans were approved for commercial release in 1996, political oppo sition increased to the point that the EU placed a moratorium on the import and the commercialization of any new GM crops, a policy that began to be lifted slowly in 2004. Behind this dispute lie deeply set differences over the role of science in assessing food safety and over how precaution in regula tion is to be implemented.
Second, aside from the worries about food safety, others point to evi dence that GM plants will cross-pollinate with non-GM plants of the same species or potentially with other plants, particularly weeds, in the wild. Finally, the transfer of genetic information and processes across species types and from one locality to virtually any other one raises questions about whether genes and genetic processes are a common heritage of humankind or "intellectual property" that can be patented and owned privately. These This commission is concerned with preserving genetic resources, whether on site (in situ) or in special collections (ex situ), and is the host of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources.
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The philosophy behind this treaty provides a direct linkage to the fourth sphere of authority overseeing the conservation and sustaining of biological diversity, whose principal site of governance is the Convention on Biolog ical Diversity (CBD) signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
The CBD is also host to an international agreement on biological security, The US Congress has never ratified the CBD. Developing countries often find that the United States and the EU use political pressures to try to press them to take one side or the other.
Three areas of conflict between these poles are particularly pronounced.26
First, there are important differences between the United States and the EU over the use of precaution in assessing the risks to human health from geneti cally modified organisms (GMOs). Second, many farmers and indigenous peoples fear that IPRs will deny the benefits they are due from traditional knowledge and end customary cultivation practices. There are intractable dif ferences between those who favor liberalized trading rules and those who demand restrictive trade measures that are permitted in order to realize the promise of such multilateral environmental agreements as the CBD. Con sistent with theories that emphasize the intractability of differences that emerge in the complex connectivity of contemporary globalization, these conflicts not only appear insusceptible to resolution through rational vol untarism, but they also raise questions about the very concept of "rational progress" at the heart of the first, "world culture," hypothesis.
Organizational
Change and Nonstate Actors
As it bears upon the governance of plant biotechnology, global civil society has neither emerged in a long gradual process nor been restricted to politi cal activity that conforms to world culture norms and rational voluntarism.
It is the result of a complex institutionalization of new spheres of authority at the global level and the highly contentious politics that has emerged from governance initiatives of states and these sites of authority. If the second hypothesis on global civil society formation is to be credible, we should also see nonstate actors that are present in the policy space assuming a net work form as they engage in governance. Moreover, the globalizing dimen sions of plant biotechnology should push them to increase the global exten sity of their membership domains. Given the range and scope of potential nonstate actors with interests in plant biotechnology, it is difficult to assess how many are active in the pol icy space. Some of these are national organizations that have enough resources to enable them to participate in nation-state politics and global politics. Others are transnational, including corporations, interest associa tions, and social movement organizations. Through extensive interviews with government officials and nonstate actors active on plant biotechnology issues, we learned that four subsets of actors are particularly central to the space: agricultural producers or farmers, the principal users of the technol ogy; biotechnology companies, the developers and sellers of the technology; ecologists, the main source of opposition on biological diversity grounds; and consumers, the most articulate opponents in terms of food safety.27 We find considerable evidence that the global organizations representing these constituencies have evolved to take on a network form and that they have made particular efforts to increase the global extensity of their membership since the early 1990s. Beginning in the early 1990s, IFOAM put in place a regional structure that permits it to operate more effectively as a global actor. These regional groups cover Asia, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, anglophone Africa, and francophone Africa. Together these new activities support the organization's description of itself as the "coordinat ing network of the organic movement around the world," a description con sistent with IFAP's own description of its evolution.31
In response to the uneven effects of globalizing processes in agriculture and their potential to destroy long-standing ways of living in every conti nent, Via Campesina came into existence in 1992, taking a network form more decentered than that of IFAP and IFOAM. Rather being a formal interest association whose members are other associations of similar form at the national level, Via Campesina is a network of social movement or ganizations: "This organization is used to unite landless peasants, small and medium-sized producers, agricultural workers, rural women and indigenous communities in the struggle against the globalization of the economy and consequently, the neo-liberal model."32 With adherents in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe, Via Campesina has organized political campaigns that tie together issues related to each node of the policy space: biological diversity, intellectual property, food security, and international trade. It opposes GMOs. Its members come heavily from developing countries. Its challenge to existing rules is anchored in a broad understanding of biological diversity: "Biodiversity has as a fundamental base the recogni tion of human diversity, the acceptance that we are different and that every people and each individual has the freedom to think and to be. Seen in this way, biodiversity is not only flora, fauna, earth, water and ecosystems; it is also cultures, systems of production, human and economic relations, forms of government; in essence, it is freedom."33 It then goes on to propose that biodiversity should be the basis to guarantee food security as a fundamen tal non-negotiable right of all peoples. This right, it adds, must prevail over the rules of the WTO. The movement also highlights the importance of intellectual property issues as part of its alternative vision, calling for a moratorium on "bioprospecting"?the exploitation, gathering, and harvest ing of genetic resources, and genetic engineering. Via Campesina's con struction of linkages between nodes in the policy space is suggestive again of the fluidity and highly contested character of the politics in the space.
The Biotechnology Industry
The pattern of significant organizational changes of farmers' groups in response to the growth of the policy space is similar in biotechnology firms. Many of the larger plant biotechnology companies originated as producers Global Civil Society and Nonterntorial Governance of agricultural chemicals. When these companies saw important synergies between their chemicals and transgenic technologies that could produce seeds resistant to these chemicals, they moved to buy seed companies and to build biotechnology capacity. Examples of companies that followed this path are Monsanto, Bayer, and BASF. Traditionally, these companies had promoted and defended their interests at the nation-state level through interest associations representing the agricultural chemicals industry. When the word chemicals became a dirty one in the eyes of environmentalists during the 1980s, these associations changed their names, often in a coor dinated fashion across states, to "crop protection institutes." They also The only exception to this pattern is Sumitomo, which belongs to the EU and Japanese groups only. In turn, these regional associations included the long-standing national agricultural chemicals associations or "crop protection institutes." Some of these national-level groups have since renamed themselves to be consistent with CropLife International.
These eight companies are part of the broader biotechnology sector, with many of them developing the technology for uses in other areas, including pharmaceuticals. At the national level, business interest associations exist to represent the whole sector. Perhaps the best known of these, and one that has been active globally in its own right, is the Biotechnology Industry Organiza tion (BIO) of the United States. It has not always acted on its own, however. BIO joined forces with BIOTECanada, EuropaBio, and the Japan Bioindustry Association to form a loose global network in 1998: the Global Industry
Coalition. This coalition operates on a more ad hoc basis, coming together to intervene at critical junctures with various global governing organizations. It is true that we have an international team that works on these questions, ation of sixty-eight autonomous national member groups with a core staff of fifteen professionals at its international secretariat. OECD countries account for twenty-six of these members, indicating that FOEI has more bridgeheads into the Global South than does Greenpeace. In its own history, FOEI reports that its global reputation was solidified in the 1990s, as it faced ever more global social and environmental issues. During this period, its membership in non-OECD countries grew rapidly.36
Consumers' Organizations
Consumers are drawn into the policy space through their concerns about food security and food safety, including risk assessment, and how these issues are affected by the rapid increase in global trade of processed foods. 
Conclusion
We recognize fully the dangers of generalizing from a single case study.
Nonetheless, this analysis does raise questions about the credibility of the world culture hypothesis. In doing so, it joins research on policy areas like human rights, the environment, violence against women, and global justice, which see global civil society as a new phenomenon that has emerged in response to states' attempts to institutionalize particular trajectories for globalization. It takes the form of an intricate web of nonstate actors deeply divided over the merit of such attempts.
Our analysis offers three points on the nature of emergent global civil society. First, the formation of global civil society in the policy space for plant biotechnology appears to follow a two-stage process. In the first stage, several spheres of authority emerge around governance of international trade, biological diversity, food security and safety, and intellectual prop erty. Governments play a key role in the emergence of these spheres of authority, but we know as well that civil society actors will have pressured them to act in each sphere. Once created, however, with conflicting princi ples and norms institutionalized to varying degrees in each sphere, thereby drawing support from some nonstate actors but not others, the policy space takes on a life of its own. In the process, the interchanges between the spheres of authority create significant incentives for the growth of global civil soci ety. Such growth promises to be robust and longer lasting; it is not simply the mobilization of various social movements around a key event like the Seattle ministerial of the WTO in 1999.
Second, our data suggest that some nonstate actors may respond to these incentives more strongly than others. For example, the plant biotech nology industry and ecologists' organizations changed to different degrees. The eight dominant biotechnology corporations reorganized their interest representation by giving CropLife International a new focus, linking it to regional organizations where the corporations also sit on the given boards of directors, which in turn link to domestic representatives. This plan gives the corporations concerned a global network where they can respond quickly to challenges to their technology on a regional and a national level. Green peace changed much less, and it is still heavily anchored in OECD coun tries transnational corporations?from their definitions, arguing that these organ izations' primary objective is making profits rather than negotiating new social contracts (Kaldor) or extending "cordiality," defined as "voluntarily experiencing the virtues of sociality and self-consciously representing one self in a group in a social context" (Wapner).40
In our case study, biotechnology corporations did tend to conform to these constraints, at least on the surface, by rebuilding their own organiza tion, CropLife International, in a netw orked, more globally extensive form. We suggest, however, that it would be na?ve to think that global corpora tions like Monsanto or Bayer CropScience are not themselves active in a political space seeking to structure the policy trajectory for the technologies they own. Such corporations usually have "political affairs" divisions that advocate directly for the political interests of these firms, all the while working behind the scenes in associations. They are similarly active in global policymaking. Keck and Sikkink argue, "To understand how change occurs in the world polity we have to understand the quite different logic and process among the different categories of transnational actors"; to fail to do so, they add, would be to "eliminate the struggles over power and understanding the logic and ways of political advocacy of transnational cor porations must be every bit as important to studying global civil society. To look only at associations, or even more restrictively at social movements, would be to miss a crucial part of potential disparities in influence and power in global civil society. Globalization's challenge to democracy results from the destabilization of the long-standing linkage between the territorial nation-state and democ racy. Once authority migrates to new spheres beyond the control of any one state, thereby necessitating cooperation between states and a more global civil society, the realization of democracy becomes problematic. Con fronted with this problem, many scholars have postulated the importance of global civil society in advancing democracy at a global level. This argu ment is an important one. In light of our analysis of policymaking in one transnational policy area, however, those making this argument need to take a careful look at how global civil society is constituted. As in civil society at the domestic level, corporate actors with concerns about profit will be present, whether directly or through interest associations. To think other wise is to misjudge the depth of the challenges to the democratization of 
